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526 Mrr:.t.ER v. DYER [20 C; (2d) 
[L. A. No. 17908. In Bank. July 10, 1942.] 
CURTIS E. MILLER et al., Appellants, v. MABELLE M. ' 
DYER et al., Respondents. 
[1] Specific Performance-Defendant's Title ........ While specific per-
formance will not be decreed against a vendor: who has no 
title or interest in the land that he contracts to convey, the, 
rule is otherwise where he is the eqJlitable owner and has the 
right to cajl for the legaltitle. Under this rule, specific per-
formance may be decreed against a person where a limdowner 
had agreed to convey property to him, and had deposited the 
deed to' the property in escrow with the intention of passing' OOL ' , 
[2] ld.-Mutuality-Exceptions.-While a vendor may not force 
a defective title on an unwilling purchaser or compel perform-
'ance while conditions precedent to his' recovery remain for 
him to perform (Civ. Code, §§ 3392, 3394), he cannot defend 
an action for specific performance .on the ground' that his title 
is not so complete as the one he agreed to convey. If the 
vendor has any interest in the property he has contracted to 
COI).vey, the vendee, at his option, may enforce the contract 
with respeet to whatever interest the vendor possesses,and may 
also receive compensation for the deficiency in performance; 
(Contrary statement in Linehan v. Devincense, 170 Cal. 307, 
149 Pac. 584, disapproved.) 
[3] Id.-Mutuality-Exceptions.-The rUle of mutuality of rem-
edy declared in Civ. Code, § 3386, is not applicable where the 
unavailability of the remedy to the party against whom specific 
relief is sought resulted from his own default. 
[4] ld.-Parties-Against Whom Relief Had.-Equity avoids cir-
cuity of action; and in an action for specific performance of a 
contract to convey made by one who holds the equitable title 
to land as the result of the landowner's agreement to convey 
to him and the deposit of a deed to the property in escrow with 
the intention of passing title, the laitdowner may be compelled 
to convey the legal title to the plaintiff. 
[5] ld.-;-Parties-Against Whom Relief Had-Lender and EScrow 
Holdar.-Where a person agrees to I).egotiate a loan on realty 
[2] See 23 Cal. Jur. 474; 25 R. C. L. 232. 
[3] See 23 Cal. Jur. 448. 
McK. Dig. R,eferences: [1] Specific Performance, § 15; [2, 3] Spe-
cific Performance, § 55; [4,5] Specific Performance, § 99; [6] Plead-
jng, § 96; [7] Actions, § 43; [8] Frauds, Statute of, § 52. 
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[6] 
[7] 
[8] 
owned by another and to transfer both the amount o:fthe l~an 
and the realty to the other contracting party, where such ~o~n 
secured by an encumbrance on the property is negotiated, and 
where the amount of the loan' and a deed by the landowner 
are delivered to a title, company in escrow, in an action for 
specific performance of the contract the determination of the 
interests of the lender and the escrow holder is, necessary, .to 
give the plaintiff proper relief and to avoid circuity, of action, 
and the complaint states a cause of action against them. 
Pleading-Demurrer-Specification in Special Demurrer~A 
special demurrer for misjoinder of parties and, causes of action 
~ust specify wherein the misjoinder exists. ' 
Abtiona.......Joinder-Single Cause of Action-E:frect of Relief 
Sought.-A complaint for specific performance of an agree-
ment to convey real property and for damages occasion,ed by 
delay in performance states a single cause of action. The re-
pudiation of the contract gives rise to a single cause of action 
regardless of the remedies available. 
Frauds, Statute of-Oral Modification of Written Contract;-
Specific performance of a written agreement to exchange real 
property is not prevented by Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. 4, merely 
because of the fact that a supplementary oral agreement to 
make up in cash the amount of the loan deducted by the lender 
may be unenforceable.' 
APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of Orange 
County. Franklin G. West, Judge. Reversed. 
Action for specific performance of a contract for exchange 
of realty and for damages occasioned by delay. Judgment ,of 
dismissal, following the refusal to amend after the sustaining 
,of demurrers to the second amended complaint, reversed .. 
John A. Jorgenson for Appellants. 
Howard F. Shepherd and Harvey, Rimel & Harvey for 
Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, J.-In this action for specific performance of 
a contract for the exchange of real property and for damages 
occasioned by delay in performance, the trial court sustained 
'general and special demurrers to the' second amended com-
plaint with leave to amend. Plaintiffs have appealed from 
judgments of dismissal entered upon their refusal to amend. 
[S] See 12 Cal. Jur. 925. 
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528 MILLER v. DYER [20C. (2d) 
The complaint sets forth the following allegations: Defen-
dant Mabelle Dyer agreed by written contract to pay the 
plaintiffs $250, to convey to them certain real property that 
she owned, to negotiate a loan of $2,000 on a parcel of realty 
owned by defendants Hector and Elizabeth Dyer,. a'nd to 
transfer both the amount of the loan and the' realty to plain-
tiffs in return for a conveyance to her of certain real prop-
erty owned by one of the plaintiffs. The value or the latter 
property approximates that of the properties and the cash 
that she was to transfer to them. Mabelle Dyer at the same 
time entered into a written contract with Hector and Eliza-
beth Dyer whereby the latter agreed to convey to her their 
real property, and she agreed to pay for it by executing and 
delivering to them a $3,000 trust deed on the property that 
she was to receive from plaintiffs. Appropriate deeds were 
deposited in escrow including one executed and delivered by 
Hector and Elizabeth Dyer "with the intention of passing 
title" to their property to Mabelle Dyer. The escrow clerk, 
however, returned that deed to Hector Dyer for a clerical 
correction without the knowledge or consent of plaintiffs. 
Mabelle Dyer obtained a loan of $2,000 from the defendant 
Laguna Federal Savings and Loan Association secured by 
a trust deed on the property. The lender required, however, 
that $500 of the loan be deducted and retained to cover the 
cost of repairs it deemed necessary. Mabelle Dyer agreed 
orally with the plaintiffs to make up the deduction in cash. 
The balance of the loan was transmitted to the defendant 
Title Insurance & Guarantee Company to be held by it for 
the parties entitled thereto upon the completion of the entire 
transaction. Defendants Mabelle, Hector, and Elizabeth Dyer 
have repudiated the transaction. Hector and Elizabeth Dyer 
refuse to redeliver their deed in escrow and, Mabelle Dyer 
has instructed the title company not to pay to plaintiffs the 
loan funds it has on hand. The title company and the loan 
association claim to have an interest in the property adverse 
to plaintiffs. 
[1] In support of their general demurrers respondents con-
tend that the complaint fails to state a cause of action against 
Mabelle Dyer since it shows that she has no title to the land 
she contracted to convey and that she cannot perform her 
agreement to borrow $2,000 on the property and pay that 
sum to plaintiffs. If the vendor has no title or interest in 
the land that he contracts to convey he will not be required 
specifically to perform. The decree would be of n.o avail for 
.~ 
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equity will not compel him to obtain title. (Title G'ltarantee 
etc. 00. v. Henry, 208 Cal. 185 [280 Pac. 959]; Smith v. 
Bangham, 156 Cal. 359 [104 Pac. 689].) If, hqwever, the 
vendor is the equitable owner and has the right to call for 
the legal title, specific performance will be decreed at the 
suit of his vendee. (Farnum v. Olarke, 148 Cal. 610 [84 Pac. 
166] ; Easton v. Montgomery, 90 Cal. 307 [27 Pac. 280, 25 
Am. St. Rep. 123]; M'Donald v. Yungbluth, 46 Fed. 836; 
Miedema v. Wormho1tdt, 288 Ill. 537 [123 N. E. 954] ; Outler 
v. Lovinger, 212 Mich. 272 [180 N. W. 462]. See, also, Pome-
roy, Specific Performance of Contracts, 3d ed., p. 667). When 
Hector jlnd Elizabeth Dyer agreed to convey their real prop-
erty to Mabelle Dyer, and deposited the deed to such property 
in escrow, "with the intention of passing title," Mabelle Dyer 
became the equitable owner of the land and Hector and 
Elizabeth Dyer held the legal title in trust for her as pur-
chaser. (Keese v. Beardsley, 190 Cal. 465 [213 Pac. 500, 26 
A. L. R. 1538]; Jackson v. Torrence, 83 Cal. 521 [23 Pac. 
695] ; Gilbert v. Sleeper, 71 Cal. 290 [12 Pac. 172].) Mabelle 
Dyer could convey that equitable interest or title, (Rogers 
Etc. 00. v. Southern Oalifornia Eto. 00., 159 Cal. 735 [115 
Pac. 934, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 543]; Easton v. Montgomery, 
supra), and she can be compelled to do so in this action for 
specific performance. [2] Mabelle Dyer's inability to convey to plaintiffs complete 
title to the land that she contracted to purchase from Hector 
and Elizabeth Dyer, and her inability to transfer to plain-
tiffs the entire proceeds of the loan would prevent her from 
specifically enforcing her contract with plaintiffs since a 
vendor may not force a defective title on an unwilling pur-
chaser or compel performance while conditio:ris~reced~nt to 
his recovery remain for him to perform. (Civ. Code §§ 3394, 
3392. See, also, 23 Cal. Jur. 474). She cannot, however, de-
fend this action on the ground that her title. is not so com-
plete as the one she agreed to convey. If the vendor has any 
interest in the property that he has contracted to' convey, the 
vendee, at his option, lllay enforce the contract with respect 
to whatever interest the vendor possesses, and m:ay also re-
ceive compensation for the deficiency in perfQrniance. 
(Smiddy v. Grafton, 163 Cal. 16 [124 Pac. 433, Ann. Cas. 
1913 E. 921); lJ'arn1tm v. Olarke,' supra; MoOowen v. Pew, 
147 Cal. 299 [81 Pac. 958l;Easton v. Montgomery, s1ipra; 
Swain v. Bu.rnette, 76 Cal. 299 [18 Pac. 394]; Marshall v; 
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530 MILLER V. DYER [20 C. (2d) 
Caldwell, 41 Cal. 611. See, also, Pomeroy, Specific Perform-
ance of Contracts, 3d ed., p. 900). In Linehan v. Devincense, 
170 Cal. 307 [149 Pac. 584], the vendee failed to show an 
existing contract and his unexplained laches precluded any 
right to specific performance. The statement in the opinion 
that "as she [the vendor] could not have compelled specific 
performance of the contract, so specific performance may 
not be enforced against her ... [citing Civ. Code § 3386]" 
was not necessary to the decis:ionof the case, and is without 
support in the authorities. It is therefore disapproved by our 
decision herein. [3] Section 3386 of the Civil Code, which states 
that "Neither party to an obligation can be compelled spe-
cifically to perform it, unless the other party thereto has per-
formed, or is compellable specifically to perform, everything 
to which the former is entitled under the same Obliga-
tion ... " codifies the rule of mutuality of remedy that was 
well established in equity jurisprudence at the time of the 
adoption of the code. (See, 23 Cal. Jur.448.) That rule was 
never considered applicable where the unavailability of the 
remedy to the party against whom relief was sought resulted 
from his own default. (Smiddy v. Grafton, supra; Farnum 
v. Clarke, supra; McCowen v. Pew, supra; Easton v. Mont-
gomery, supra; Swain v. Burnette, supra; Marshall v. Cald-
well, supra,' Armstrong v. Sacramento V. R. Co., 52 Cal. App. 
110 [198 Pac. 217]. See, also, 28 Cal. L. Rev. 503; 16 Cal. 
L. Rev. 541; Pomeroy, Specific Performance, 3d ed., p. 903 
(1926); 2 Story, Equity Jurisprudence, 4th ed., p. 457 (1918». 
[4] It is contended that the complaint fails to state a cause 
of action against Hector and Elizabeth Dyer since they were 
not parties to the contract that plaintiffs seek specifically to 
enforce. They hold the legal title to the land sought to be 
conveyed, however, as trustees for Mabelle Dyer. Since the 
latter may be compelled to convey her equitable interest in 
the land to plaintiffs and since equity avoids cirCUity of 
action, Hector and Elizabeth Dyer may be compelled to con-
vey the legal title to them. (M'Donald v. Yungbluth, supra,' 
Miedema v. Wormhoudt, supra,' see 33 Harv. L. Rev. 822.) 
[5] It is also contended that the complaint fails to state a 
cause of action against the title company and the loan asso-
ciation. The title company holds the proceeds of the loan for 
the benefit of the party entitled thereto Upon the completion 
of the transaction. The loan association made the loan, trans-
--~.-.---.------.~~-------
i."'-
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mitted the proceeds to the title company, and received a trust 
deed on the land involved. The asserted adverse interests of 
both defendants in the property arose out of transactions 
with the principal defendant, Mabelle Dyer, concerning her 
contract with the plaintiffs. Those interests must. be .deter-
mined to give plaintiffs proper relief and to avoid' circuity 
of action. '., 
[6] The special demurrer of defend~nts title company: and 
loan association on the grounds of misjoinder of parties de-
fendant and of improper uniting of several causes of action 
fails to specify wherein the alleged misjoinder exists. (Healy 
v. Visalia &7 T. R. Co., 101 Cal. 585 [36 Pac. 125].) [71The i spe-
cial demurrer of defendants Dyer on the. ground that ca~ses 
of action for specific per~ormance and for breach{)fanltgr~e~ 
mentto convey real property have been united improperly 
fails to take into account that the repudiation of the con,tract 
gave, rise to a single cause of action reg~rdless of the "re:me~ 
dies available to plaintiffs. (Abbott v. 7q .Land &7 Water Co" 
161CaL42 [118 Pac. 425] ; San Diego Wa~er Co. v"SanDiego 
Flume Co., 108 Cal. 549 [41 ;Pac. 495, 29L.<R.A;839];) 
[8] The contention that the alleged calise of action is barred 
by the provisions of subdivision 40'£ section 1624 of the Civil 
Code because apart of the alleged agreement for the exchange 
of real property was not in writing· is·' untenable, The . fact 
that Mabelle Dyer's supplementary oral agreement to make 
up in cash the amount of the loan deducted by the lender 
may be unenforceable ,.loes not prevent enforcement of the 
written contract; (See cases cited in 12 Cal. JUl'. 925.) 
The judgments are reversed. 
Gibson, C.J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., and Car-
ter, J., concurred. 
(L. A. 18222. In Bank. July 11, 1942.] 
MANUEL A. MORENO, Appellant, v. JAMES CAIRNS· 
~t al., Respondents. 
[1] Municipal Oorporations-Officers and Employees-Removal~ 
Reinstatement-,-Oonditions Precedent.-'-A charter. provision 
[1] See 12 Cal. Jur. 800; 6 Cal. Jur. Ten-year Supp. 60; 37 Am. 
Jur.874. 
McK. Dig. Reference: [1, 2] Municipal Corporations,§313. 
